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More Sensible Shoes

By Guy Span, S.D.

New York’s horrific ferry accident at Staten Island is a wake-up call for ferry operators. While San Francisco has an excellent history of safety, even back in the radar-less fog-shrouded days, there have been accidents. In 1886, the North Pacific Coast steamer, San Rafael raced the San Francisco and North Pacific’s Tiburon to the Ferry Building causing a collision when neither would give way. No one was injured. In 1888, Southern Pacific’s Julia suffered a boiler explosion while tied to the dock in South Vallejo, killing the engine room crew.

Then in 1901 on a foggy night, the San Rafael was impaled by the Sausalito and as the unfortunate San Rafael settled into the Bay, all the passengers were transferred across on a plank except for a few who were fished out of the chilly waters. The only known loss of life in that incident was "Old Dick," the horse that had for years worked the San Rafael hauling baggage and he refused to leave. In 1908 the Newark was struck by the Oakland in the fog, again with no injuries. 1918 found Monticello Steamship Company’s General Frisbee striking their own Sehome, both in the fog. The Sehome sank although all passengers were transferred to the surviving vessel. 1927 found the steamer Newport in dense fog ramming the Garden City, which reportedly sunk in less than five minutes. Again, all passengers were transferred without loss. A freak accident in 1928 involving the Key System’s Peralta killed five when they were swept overboard.

More recently, we had a near miss between Vallejo’s and Golden Gate’s two high-speed ferries, a number of damaging low-speed dock impacts and most recently, a Vallejo ferry slammed into the dock on October 11, causing one minor injury.

Officials are aware that while unlikely, it is possible to have a catastrophic incident with one of our lightweight, high-speed ferries. There currently exists a mutual aid agreement among the ferry companies whereby every nearby ferry will stop its run and rush to the aid of a stricken ferry. While the current U.S. Coast Guard opinion of high-speed ferries is judged to be safe, given modern equipment, the question remains as to how sensible they are. In terms of fuel consumption, hull thickness, passenger capacity, number of vessels operated, safety issues and future ferry routes, our current crop of low-capacity, high-speed vessels may just fail the sensibility test.

Ask any ferry operator or agency what element is critical and, after safety, they generally respond with some variation of the pat phrase, "the currency of transit is speed." That is, to get patrons, the service must be faster than driving. Vallejo has proven this with a huge jump in ridership when the new high-speed ferries were added, decreasing the time from Vallejo to 55 minutes. But the question still remains, how fast is fast enough? For Vallejo, with current highway traffic levels and two, $2 bridge tolls, 55 minutes is fast enough.

That is today’s answer. Tomorrow’s might be different, assuming higher bridge tolls, higher gasoline prices (that are inevitable), and even more congestion. So if the minimum driving time to San Francisco rises to an hour and fifteen minutes, then a large Vallejo ferry running the same route in slightly less time would become attractive.

Larger ferries at slower speeds would be more economical to operate for a variety of reasons. First of all, you need fewer of them, because capacity can be increased to several thousand. Operating more slowly, lower revolution diesel engines can operate more reliably with lower maintenance costs. With higher capacity, fuel consumption per passenger can actually decrease. Fewer ferries of higher capacity reduce the risk of collisions (because there are less of them). Slower steel mono-hull ferries will stand up to a collision of greater force than can their high-speed, thin-aluminum-skinned sisters. Larger capacities that generate more riders can reduce the cost per passenger. Building fewer larger vessels will reduce the capital cost for ferries on a per passenger basis.

However, we have today’s problems today. Every waterfront community wants its own ferry. High-speed ferries are sexy and not every community can support a large ferry. Thus, for today, a more sensible interim solution might be found in slower, medium speed, medium capacity steel mono-hulls, such as Blue & Gold’s ex-Catalina Island ferries. These vessels have dependable diesel engines, capacities to 550 and an operating speed that on a good day, will almost allow them to operate the Alameda-Oakland ferry schedule, unchanged. These are sensible ferries. Smaller and more economical versions could be built to serve the lighter density runs.

Standardization might prove economical, as well. Three standard plans for a medium speed ferry for three different capacities would reduce maintenance costs and create a completely interchangeable fleet. Right now, except for Vallejo and Golden Gate (which have up to two vessels in a class) there is no standard vessel design for the Bay. Alameda-Oakland’s Peralta is different from its backup vessel Encinal. Harbor Bay has two one-of-a-kind ferries, both different from those of Alameda-Oakland. Anyone involved in fleet maintenance can tell you that standardized parts reduce inventory costs and reduce downtime for maintenance. Standard designs would also reduce construction costs and spread out design costs over a number of vessels.

Such standard medium speed ferries would also have the capacity to provide real service in the event of an earthquake emergency that damaged another bridge. High-speed low capacity ferries are generally fairly close to the Coast Guard approved limit at commute hours (with some exceptions). Regardless of current loading conditions, by definition, low-capacity ferries offer little in the way of additional emergency services in the event of an earthquake disaster.

A regional ferry plan that calls for lots of expensive little fast ferries zipping around the Bay like water spiders may not be the best, safest, and most rational use of scarce capital dollars and even more scarce operating subsidies. If we are going to walk the distance with a regional ferry plan, we just may want more sensible shoes.